Liesman, who asked the following question:

Madam Chair, as you know, inflation has gone up the last two months. We had another strong jobs report. The tracking forecasts for GDP have returned to two percent. And yet the Fed stands pat while it’s in a process of what it said at launch in December was a process of normalization. 

 

So I have two questions about this. Does the Fed have a credibility problem in the sense that it says it will do one thing under certain conditions, but doesn’t end up doing it? And then, frankly, if the current conditions are not sufficient for the Fed to raise rates, well, what would those conditions ever look like?

The answer was a 261 word jumbled nightmare of James Joyceian stream of consciousness interspersed with high-end econobabble that we, for one, were completely unable to follow. This is what Yellen responded verbatim:

Well, let me start — let me start with the question of the Fed’s credibility. And you used the word “promises” in connection with that. And as I tried to emphasize in my opening statement, the paths that the participants project for the federal funds rate and how it will evolve are not a pre-set plan or commitment or promise of the committee. Indeed, they are not even — the median should not be interpreted as a committee-endorsed forecast.  And there’s a lot of uncertainty around each participant’s projection. And they will evolve. Those assessments of appropriate policy are completely contingent on each participant’s forecasts of the economy and how economic events will unfold. And they are, of course, uncertain. And you should fully expect that forecasts for the appropriate path of policy on the part of all participants will evolve over time as shocks, positive or negative, hit the economy that alter those forecasts. So, you have seen a shift this time in most participants’ assessments of the appropriate path for policy. And as I tried to indicate, I think that largely reflects a somewhat slower projected path for global growth — for growth in the global economy outside the United States, and for some tightening in credit conditions in the form of an increase in spreads. And those changes in financial conditions and in the path of the global economy have induced changes in the assessment of individual participants in what path is appropriate to achieve our objectives. So that’s what you see — that’s what you see now.

Got that?

Apparently neither did Liesman, who openly admitted in his traditional post-Fed spar with Rick Santelli, the following:

Santelli: Steve, could you understand any of it? Any of it seriously? Just a yes or no.

Liesman: Not much, it was not precisely responsive to the question i asked. 


 

 

I was watching this live. Because it was so funny, I have to mention this here.

중앙은행이 domestic problem을 무시하고, international problem 을 더 중시하네….ECB, IMF에서 계속 찌르더니만. 이거 미친거 아냐?!

Raise the fucking rate!!! U kidding me?????!!!!!!! no hike means losing the gov “TRUST”…..

유로는 어차피 끝났는데, 왜 미련을 갖나? 그냥 빨리 올려야 미국이 산다. 그걸 모르지 않을텐데…

no rate hike가 좋은걸까? hell no!! you forgot about domestic problem such as pension crisis? 이러다가 6월에 EU 갈라지는거 대충 확인하고 행동하겠다는건데….그떄는 늦을거로 보인다.  자본의 미국으로 쓰나미처럼 몰리고,  그러면 골때리게 되는데…..

20160325_socsec_0

It’s all 1927 again?

Two bold statements from me

  • EU는 끝났다. 6/27 Brexit에서 영국이 안나가면 영국도 같이 망하고, 영국이 나가면(영국도 나와도 왕따당하여 망할듯) 그걸 시발점으로 EU는 산산조각……EU는 이래저래 망했다. EU에서 금년내내 자본이 빠져나가고 있다. 물론
  • 1927?   yes..it looks like. 나도 1927과 1997 그리고 2007 셋중에서 오늘까지 무엇일까 맨날 헷갈렸다. It’s 1927 ! Which country has capital inflow?

2016, 2017, 2018 아주 재미있게 돌아간다…한마디로 “조때따C8”